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  THE ECONOMICS OF INTERCHANGE FEES AND THEIR REGULATION: AN 
OVERVIEW 
David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee 
I. Introduction 
In 1958 the Bank of America began operating the BankAmericard credit card system, 
the predecessor of Visa, as a unitary system.1 It performed both the issuing function (dealing 
with cardholders) and the acquiring function (dealing with merchants) itself. Similarly, it set 
the fees charged to both these customer classes—the annual fee, interest rate, late fees, and 
other fees charged to cardholders; and the per-transaction fee to merchants known as the 
merchant discount. It was therefore able to determine both the overall level of fees (which 
might be measured as total fees per dollar of transactions) and their structure (which might be 
measured by the shares of total fees paid by merchants and cardholders).  
In 1966 the Bank of America began to bring other banks into the system as 
franchisees. Individual banks within the system were free then, as now, to determine the fees 
they charged merchants and cardholders. When a consumer holding a card issued by bank A 
made a purchase at a merchant that had bank A as its acquirer, bank A could, if it wished, 
have the same fee structure as Bank of America. But what if this same consumer made a 
purchase from a merchant acquired by bank B? Bank of America required the acquiring bank 
to pass the full merchant discount to the issuing bank. Acquiring banks had incentives to lie 
about their merchant discounts under this rule, as issuing banks were well aware. More 
importantly, this rule meant that acquiring banks received zero revenue for transactions for 
which they provided the merchant but had not issued the card being used. The rule therefore 
blunted the incentives for all banks to sign up merchants, to the obvious detriment of the 
system as a whole. 
In 1970 the BankAmericard system was converted into a membership corporation, a 
multi-party system. This cooperative association established an interchange fee in 1971 to 
                                                 
1 This discussion in this paragraph and the next two follows Evans and Schmalensee 2005, pp. 153-156. 
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deal with transactions in which issuing and acquiring banks were different. This fee was paid 
by the acquiring bank to the issuing bank and initially set at 1.95 percent. It was not linked to 
any individual bank’s merchant discount. The interchange fee thus became a revenue source 
on the issuing side of the credit card business and a cost element on the acquiring side. 
Acquiring banks had to charge a merchant discount that was greater than the interchange fee 
to recover this cost. The interchange fee was an element of a standard contract that the multi-
party system established for its members; other terms of the contract defined who bore the 
risk of fraud or nonpayment, as well as how disputes would be resolved. 
This essay surveys the economic literature on interchange fees and the debate over 
whether interchange should be regulated and, if so, how. 
A. What’s Interesting About Interchange? 
Until 1979, few outside the Visa and MasterCard systems had any idea what an 
interchange fee was. In that year, the National Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) filed a lawsuit 
contending that when the Visa member banks determined the interchange fee, those banks 
engaged in illegal price-fixing, which, it was claimed, had damaged NaBanco.2 An appeals 
court found in favor of Visa in 1986, holding that the interchange fee had potential efficiency 
benefits for a two-sided system: 
Another justification for evaluating the [interchange fee] under the rule of 
reason is because it is a potentially efficiency creating agreement among 
members of a joint enterprise. There are two possible sources of revenue in the 
VISA system: the cardholders and the merchants. As a practical matter, the 
card-issuing and merchant-signing members have a mutually dependent 
relationship. If the revenue produced by the cardholders is insufficient to cover 
the card-issuers’ costs, the service will be cut back or eliminated. The result 
would be a decline in card use and a concomitant reduction in merchant-
signing banks’ revenues. In short, the cardholder cannot use his card unless the 
merchant accepts it and the merchant cannot accept the card unless the 
cardholder uses one. Hence, the [interchange fee] accompanies “the 
coordination of other productive or distributive efforts of the parties” that is 
                                                 
2 National Bancard Corporation v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. 1984, 1986a, and 1986b. 
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“capable of increasing the integration’s efficiency and no broader than required 
for that purpose.”3 
In 1983, William Baxter, a leading antitrust scholar who had worked for Visa on the 
case, published an important paper on the economic rationale for interchange fees in 1983.4 
But after the NaBanco decision, interchange fees faded from view in academic and policy 
circles and was a topic of interest mainly to industry insiders. 
A few academic papers in the 1990s mentioned interchange fees,5 but for the most 
part, this topic languished in obscurity until around the turn of this century. And then, as the 
dates on most of the entries in this essay’s list of references indicate, interest in interchange 
fees increased dramatically among academics, banking regulators and competition authorities 
around the world. 
Two developments caught the attention of policymakers. Cards had become an 
increasingly important part of the payment system in many countries. The share of consumer 
expenditures in the United States paid for with cards had increased from about 3 percent in 
1986, the year of the NaBanco decision, to 25 percent in 2000.6 Similar increases occurred in 
other countries. For example, in 2000, cards accounted for 30 percent of consumer 
expenditures in Australia and 35 percent in the United Kingdom.7 While American Express 
played a significant role in the United States, globally most cards were associated with multi-
party systems that had interchange fees. In the United Kingdom, for example, an influential 
report on the banking industry issued in 2000—the “Cruickshank Report”—addressed 
interchange fees in multi-party systems, concluding that “[t]here is a strong case for reform of 
the interchange fee system.”8 
For retailers, merchant discounts (which included interchange fees in the bank card 
systems) had become a growing portion of their costs, as more people paid with cards. Some 
                                                 
3 National Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. 1986a, p. 602. 
4 Baxter 1983. We discuss this paper below. 
5 These include Carlton and Frankel 1995a and 1995b, Evans and Schmalensee 1995, and Frankel 1998. 
6 HSN Consultants 1987, 1991, 1992, 2001a, and 2001b, and United States Department of Commerce2003. 
7 Visa International 2001. Measures of consumer expenditures may not be entirely consistent across countries 
but are sufficiently comparable to provide a rough sense of importance. See also Weiner and Wright 2005. 
8 Cruickshank 2000, p. 272. 
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retailers had periodically complained about merchant discounts; hotels had gone so far as to 
create their own card system in the United States in the mid 1950s to avoid the merchant 
discount of Diners Club (a unitary system). However, with increases in interchange fees and 
perhaps other legal and political developments, various organizations of retailers around the 
world sought regulatory relief from the fees. For example, EuroCommerce, a retailer 
association, filed a complaint with the European Commission in 1997. This led to an 
investigation of Visa Europe and ultimately a settlement in which Visa Europe agreed to 
lower the interchange fees. Interchange fee levels have also been under active attack and/or 
regulated in a number of other countries, including Australia and the United Kingdom.9 
Why has interest in interchange fees surged among economists in recent years? Some, 
including us, were exposed to the topic through their involvement in litigation and/or 
regulatory proceedings. But the same could be said for many other legal and regulatory issues 
that have spawned much smaller literatures over longer periods of time. The large volume of 
theoretical literature on interchange fees has arisen for the simplest of reasons: understanding 
their determination and effect is intellectually challenging. As the discussion below indicates, 
this is not necessarily good news for policy-makers.  
B. This Essay 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section provides context 
by considering the operation of unitary payment systems, like American Express, in the 
context of the recent economic literature on two-sided markets, in which businesses cater to 
two interdependent groups of customers. The main focus is on the determination of price 
structure. We then discuss the basic economics of multi-party payment systems and the role of 
interchange in the operation of such systems under some standard, though unrealistic, 
simplifying assumptions. The key point of this discussion is that the interchange fee is not an 
ordinary price; its most direct effect is on price structure, not price level. While it is clear that 
an unregulated monopolist or a cartel in a one-sided market, like electricity generation, would 
                                                 
9 See Reserve Bank of Australia 2002, European Commission 2002 and 2003, and Office of Fair Trading 2003. 
Weiner and Wright (2005) provide a useful overview of government involvement. 
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set a price that is higher than would be socially optimal, no such presumption exists for the 
interchange fee set by a monopoly card system.  
We then consider implications for privately determined interchange fees of some of 
the relevant market imperfections that have been discussed in the economic literature. While 
some studies suggest that privately determined interchange fees are inefficiently high, others 
point to fees being inefficiently low. Moreover, there is a consensus among economists that, 
as a matter of theory, it is not possible to arrive, except by happenstance, at the socially 
optimal interchange fee through any regulatory system that considers only costs. This 
distinguishes the market imperfections at issue here for multi-party systems from the more 
familiar area of public utility regulation, where setting price equal to marginal cost is 
theoretically ideal. 
The penultimate section examines the implications of the results of the previous 
sections for policy makers. Since there is so much uncertainty about the relation between 
privately and socially optimal interchange fees, the outcome of a policy debate can depend 
critically on who bears the burden of proof under whatever set of institutions and laws the 
deliberation takes place. There is no apparent basis in today’s economics—at a theoretical or 
empirical level—for concluding that it is generally possible to improve social welfare by a 
noticeable reduction in privately set interchange fees. Thus, if antitrust or other regulators had 
to show that such intervention would improve welfare, they could not do so. This, again, is 
quite unlike public utility regulation or many areas of antitrust including, in particular, 
ordinary cartels. By the same token, there is no basis in economics for concluding that the 
privately set interchange fee is just right. Thus, if card associations had to bear the burden of 
proof—for example, to obtain a comfort or clearance letter from authorities for engaging in 
presumptively illegal coordinated behavior—it would be difficult for them to demonstrate that 
they set socially optimal fees.  
We take a pragmatic approach by suggesting two fact-based inquiries that we believe 
policymakers should undertake before intervening to affect interchange. These inquiries are 
premised on the view, which we believe is now widely held, that the government should 
intervene in markets only when there is a sound basis for believing that it can devise policies 
that will improve social welfare significantly. First, policymakers should establish that there is 
6 
a significant market failure that needs to be addressed. To do so they would need to examine 
the marginal social benefits and costs of alternative payment systems as they vary among 
transactions; we suggest that there is highly incomplete information available on these 
benefits and costs, so that any inference from the current data is at best problematic. Second, 
policymakers should establish that it is possible to correct a serious market imperfection, 
assuming one exists, by whatever intervention they are considering (such as cost-based 
regulation of interchange fee levels) and thereby to increase social welfare significantly after 
taking into account other distortions that the intervention may create. We illustrate both of 
these points by examining the recent Australian experience. 
The final section summarizes our conclusions. Many of the results of the economic 
literature necessarily depend on various simplifying assumptions. In this last section we 
highlight those that we believe are robust, in the sense that they are likely to hold generally. 
Our main focus throughout is on conceptual issues; the companion paper by Weiner and 
Wright provides a good deal of useful factual material.10 
II. Payment Systems as Two-Sided Platforms 
In the last few years, economists have come to understand that payment systems have 
much in common with auction houses, exchanges, shopping malls, and video game consoles. 
All are examples of two-sided (or, more generally, multi-sided) platform businesses. Such 
businesses are intermediaries that add value if and only if they can appropriately coordinate 
the demands of two distinct groups of customers. Beauty salons may attract both men and 
women, for instance, but heterosexual singles bars must attract both men and women—and in 
the right proportions. Similarly, shopping malls must attract both retailers and shoppers, 
auction houses need both buyers and sellers to stay in business, sellers of video games need 
both game players and game creators—and payment systems need both consumers and 
merchants. 
                                                 
10 Weiner and Wright 2005. 
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The earliest use of the term “two-sided” in this sense of which we are aware is in a 
1998 paper considering a match-making intermediary that adds value by bringing individuals 
of two different types together.11 The authors find that, under plausible conditions, one of the 
types will not pay for the service, and they note that this highly asymmetric pricing is 
descriptive of some real two-sided markets, such as real estate agents in the United States and 
some dating services. 
The reason why skewed pricing can happen is central to the analysis of two-sided 
markets in general: there are typically positive indirect network externalities between the two 
groups.12 For example, the more men (women) who use a particular dating service, the more 
attractive the service is to women (men). If the service cannot attract both in the right 
proportions and sufficient numbers, it will fail. If it needs to serve men for free to accomplish 
this, it is rational for it to do so. Giving the service away to men, even though serving them 
involves positive marginal costs, can be profitable if it attracts sufficient fee-paying women.  
The recent general literature on two-sided platform markets began around 2002 with 
early versions of a seminal contribution by Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole.13 Early 
versions of an important related paper by Mark Armstrong appeared shortly thereafter.14 
These papers pointed out that many businesses or markets can usefully be thought of as two-
sided, and they developed some general implications of the importance of balanced 
participation from the involved customer groups (or, as it is more commonly put, “getting 
both sides on board”). Since then the literature on two-sided platform markets has grown 
explosively.15 This literature generally considers one or more vendors dealing directly with 
both (or all) involved customer groups and it is thus most directly relevant in our context to 
the analysis of unitary payment systems. 
                                                 
11 Van Raalte and Webers 1998. While he used different terminology, Baxter 1983 did the first two-sided 
analysis, as we discuss below. 
12 See Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran 2003 for an attempt to quantify these externalities in a payments context. 
13 Rochet and Tirole 2003b. 
14 Armstrong 2004. 
1515 Contributions that look beyond payment systems include Armstrong 2005, Armstrong and Wright 2004, Bolt 
and Tieman 2004a and 2004b, Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Gabszewicz and Wauthy 2004, Hagiu 2004a and 
2004b, Jullien 2004, Rochet and Tirole 2004a and 2004b, and Schiff 2003. Evans 2003a and 2003b and Wright 
2004b provide accessible discussions of the implications of some of this work as well as empirical support; 
Rochet and Tirole 2004b provide a more technical overview.  
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A. Pricing by Two-Sided Platforms 
Almost all theoretical analyses of pricing by two-sided platforms assume that they 
either charge only an access or membership fee (following Armstrong) or that they charge 
only a variable or per-transaction fee (following Rochet and Tirole). While this simplification 
generally facilitates understanding of basic principles, it is problematic in some cases. 
Newspapers, for example, typically charge an access fee to readers (a fixed cost for the 
newspaper regardless of what is read), while advertisers pay a variable fee based on the 
number of readers. In the payment card context, for instance, merchants incur small fixed 
access (terminal) costs of card acceptance as well as per transaction merchant discounts. On 
the other side of that market, consumers sometimes pay membership fees, but variable fees 
are typically slightly negative as a result of free float and sometimes noticeably negative as a 
result of transaction-based reward programs.16 
The literature on pricing by two-sided platforms distinguishes between the level of 
prices and the structure of prices. The profit-maximizing price level—the price paid by men 
plus the price paid by women in the dating service example, for instance—depends on the 
costs of serving both groups, on the sensitivities of both demands to price, and on the indirect 
network effects between the two customer groups. The price sensitivities depend in the usual 
way on the price and quality of available substitutes and other factors, including, in some 
models, the presence of two-sided competitors. 
The profit-maximizing price structure—the ratio of the price paid by men to the price 
paid by women, for instance—also depends in general on costs, price sensitivities, and the 
way participation by the members of each group affects the demand of the other group.17 In 
addition, all general models of two-sided platform markets imply that profits may be 
                                                 
16 As we note below, the payment card industry has followed this pricing structure since its birth, as a two-sided 
platform, in 1950. 
17 In the Rochet-Tirole model, which is based on particular assumptions about the structure of demand, the price 
structure is completely independent of the relative costs of serving the two groups (there are no fixed costs on 
either side in their formulation). See Rochet and Tirole 2003b, pp. 996-997. 
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maximized by highly asymmetric pricing in which one group is served at a price close to or 
even below marginal cost, and most or all gross margin is earned by serving the other group.18 
It is important to note that many, if not most two-sided markets exhibit this sort of 
asymmetry in pricing and gross margin generation.19 Shopping malls, for instance, often 
provide free parking to consumers, sometimes in expensive parking structures, and make all 
their money by charging rent to merchants. Yellow Pages and competing telephone directories 
of merchants in the US are given away to consumers; all the revenue is provided by 
merchants.20 Similarly, Microsoft and Apple do not charge applications software developers 
anything for the highly valuable software services (sometime called APIs) included in their 
software platforms. Both these firms make almost all of their money from end-users of 
computer systems. (In Microsoft’s case, Windows is usually licensed to computer makers that 
in turn license it to end-users.) On the other hand, makers of video game consoles sell them to 
end users at or below cost and make most or all of their gross margin from license fees paid 
by game developers.21 
B. Unitary Payment Systems 
The general literature on multi-sided markets has immediate application to the analysis 
of unitary payment systems—like the BankAmericard system before franchising, the 
American Express system today (ignoring recent franchise-like bank deals), or the store-
specific cards offered by such merchants as Neiman-Marcus. Neglecting for the moment the 
distinction between access and variable prices, the price structure here can be described by the 
                                                 
18 We define gross margin here and below as revenues minus direct, side-specific variable costs, such as the 
manufacturing costs of video game consoles. Attributing profits to one side or another is strictly incorrect, since 
both sides must be on board for profits to be earned, and many costs in platform businesses, like the cost of 
developing the Windows operating system, are properly thought of as joint between the two sides. 
19 Bolt and Tieman 2003 offer an explanation based on the fact that some demand functions that are well-
behaved in an ordinary one-sided context yield non-concave profit functions in some two-sided models, thus 
making corner solutions (e.g., prices of zero) optimal. 
20 In the payment card context, Vickers 2005 has argued that one might find “a distortion of competition” when 
one side of the market is charged “more than all the costs” of providing services to both sides. There is no 
theoretical basis for this test of which we are aware, and this sort of pricing is not uncommon. It occurs 
whenever, as in the two examples in the text, one side of a profitable two-sided business pays nothing, so the 
other side must be charged “more than all the costs” if the enterprise is to be profitable.  
21 See Evans et al. 2004. 
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ratio of fees paid by merchants, typically in the form of the merchant discount, to transaction-
related fees paid by consumers, in the form of annual and other fees.22 Using this measure, the 
available evidence indicates that unitary systems have generally adopted asymmetric pricing 
structures and earned the bulk of their revenue from merchants, rather than consumers. 
Before 1950, payment cards were issued by retailers for use in their stores. Then, as 
now, cardholders who paid their bills within a specified amount of time (usually a bit less than 
a month) did not pay any fee for charging and in fact benefited from the float. Those who 
financed their store card charges paid interest, of course. But to our knowledge, then as now, 
retailers did not cancel cards held by customers who chronically did not finance. Although we 
would not want to push this point too far, given that store cards are one-sided and are bundled 
with finance services, store card transaction services have what might be thought of as a slight 
negative variable price and a zero access price.23 Merchants with retail cards presumably find 
that this is the optimal pricing scheme. 
Diners Club introduced the first two-sided payment platform—that is, a general 
purpose payment card that could be used by cardholders at many retailers—in 1950. After 
initially offering the cards for no fee to consumers, Diners Club settled on a business model in 
which cardholders paid an annual fee of $3 (over $18 in 2004 dollars) and a slightly negative 
transaction fee in the form of float, while merchants paid a variable fee of seven percent of 
each transaction. During the 1950s and into the early 1960s, based on available data, Diners 
Club earned about 70 percent of its revenues—and probably most of its gross margin—from 
the merchant side of the business.24  
American Express entered the card business in 1958. It adopted a similar business 
model, though it eventually settled on slightly lower merchant fees and slightly higher 
                                                 
22 By “transaction-related,” we mean that we are here following almost the entire literature and focusing on the 
payment function of credit, charge, and debit cards, putting to one side the credit function that only credit cards 
perform, and the associated revenue flow from consumers. 
23 Store cards may increase purchases by relaxing short-run liquidity constraints. As we note below, this 
argument has been advanced as a motivation for retailer acceptance of general purpose payment cards 
(particularly credit cards) by Chakravorti and To 2003. See also Chakravorti and Emmons 2003 and Wright 
2000. However, again note that we would expect that retailers would take efforts to weed out transactors if that 
were the entire motivation. 
11 
cardholder fees than Diners Club. But available data indicate that for the last four plus 
decades American Express has earned upwards of 65 percent of its transaction-related 
revenues from merchant fees (in later years some American Express cards began to bundle 
borrowing with transaction services, which makes clean comparisons more difficult).25 Bank 
of America also entered in 1958, with a card that did not charge consumers a fee, although 
there were finance charges (and associated costs of funds and default risk) from consumers 
who chose to revolve. Their merchant fee was 5 percent of each transaction.26 
Even though transactions-related costs on the acquiring side of the business seem to be 
lower than those on the issuing side,27 these unitary systems apparently concluded that the 
profit-maximizing price structure for the system—the price structure that gets and keeps both 
sets of customers on board and permits both issuers and acquirers to be profitable—is one that 
obtains the bulk of the revenue from the merchant side of the business. 
These unitary systems instituted these pricing schemes in their early years, when they 
would appear to have had little market power. We think it is fair to conclude that the 
“competitive”—certainly in the sense of non-collusive and non-monopolistic—pricing 
structure for payment cards is (or at least was for some time) one in which merchants pay a 
relatively high transaction price and cardholders pay zero or possibly slightly negative 
transaction prices plus modest fixed fees, and in which the bulk of the profits, loosely 
speaking, thus flow from the merchant side. Being the competitive pricing structure does not 
necessarily mean that it is socially optimal, however, and it is to that issue we turn next. 
                                                                                                                                                        
24 Evans and Schmalensee 2005, pp. 54-55. Annual fee converted to real 2004 dollars using the GDP implicit 
price deflator from United States Department of Commerce 2004. 
25 Evans and Schmalensee 2005, pp. 57-59, 150. In 2004, about 84 percent of American Express’s card 
transaction-related revenues came from merchants, excluding finance revenues from cardholders. The proportion 
is about 63 percent when net finance revenues are included and using American Express’s card revenues on a 
“managed” basis (which includes revenues for card loans that have been securitized); this same measure is 71 
percent on a GAAP basis (which excludes finance charges on securitized card loans). Figures calculated using 
data from American Express 2005, pp. 45-49. 
26 Wolters 2000, p. 331. 
27 The portion of the merchant discount retained by acquirers on MasterCard and Visa transactions in the United 
States averages about 0.4 percent, which goes to cover acquirers’ costs. This compares to an average interchange 
fee of about 1.7 percent, which, in combination with additional cardholder fees, goes to cover issuers’ costs. 
Evans and Schmalensee 2005, pp. 11, 262. 
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C. Profit versus Welfare 
How do prices charged in two-sided markets compare with socially optimal prices? 
Most theoretical analysis of this question considers a single firm with some market power 
(i.e., it faces demand curves that slope down—though they may be highly price-elastic) 
selling to two customer groups in an otherwise perfectly competitive economy. Under these 
assumptions it is clear that the price level will be too high because of the exercise of market 
power—a conclusion that, of course, applies to most firms in real economies. 
In fact, the monopoly pricing problem is even more serious than usual: even if 
marginal costs are constant and there are no fixed costs, the first-best social optimum requires 
setting prices that do not cover total cost, just as is the case with natural monopoly.28 The 
intuition is straightforward. In an ordinary one-sided market under the usual assumptions, 
buyers’ willingness to pay for incremental units of output provides a measure of the social 
value of that output. Thus the social optimum in such markets occurs at the output level at 
which price is equal to marginal cost, since at lower levels of output buyers are willing to pay 
more than marginal cost for incremental output, while at higher levels of output they are 
willing to pay less than marginal cost. In a two-sided market, however, increases in output on 
side A of the market provide positive benefits to buyers on side B that are not reflected in the 
side A demand curve. Thus if price equals marginal cost to customer group A, it is 
nonetheless socially beneficial to increase output to A because of the (externality) benefits 
that would thereby be conferred on members of group B. 
What about price structure? In general single-firm models of two-sided markets in 
otherwise perfectly competitive economies, one can compare the conditions defining profit-
maximizing pricing, welfare-maximizing pricing (which involves the seller losing money and, 
presumably, being subsidized by the government), and Ramsey pricing (which involves 
maximizing social welfare subject to the constraint that the firm does not lose money). 
Comparing these conditions in various models yields two general observations that appear to 
                                                 
28 This is explicitly shown in Armstrong 2004 and Bolt and Tieman 2004b. It is implicit in Rochet and Tirole 
2003b, since their analysis of socially optimal pricing imposes the binding constraint that the firm just break 
even.  
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be robust to modeling assumptions. First, neither welfare-maximizing pricing nor Ramsey 
pricing is ever purely cost-based. In both cases, the optimal price structure also depends on 
price sensitivities and externalities on both sides of the market.29 Second, there is no simple, 
general description of the relations among the profit-maximizing and Ramey price structures. 
They are rarely identical, but the sign and magnitude of the difference between them depends 
on essentially all the demand, cost, and externality parameters in the model. 
III. Interchange Fees in Multi-Party Systems 
Multi-party systems emerged in the mid 1960s.30 One was the BankAmericard 
franchise system that we mentioned earlier. Others were cooperatives of banks that agreed to 
collaborate on a card brand and, in effect, pool the merchants they had signed up so that any 
individual with a card from a member of the cooperative could use their card at any merchant 
also signed up by any member of the cooperative. The predecessor of MasterCard emerged 
during this period as a national cooperative of banks. BankAmericard adopted a cooperative 
structure a few years later. 
These banks initially had a purely practical problem to solve. When a cardholder 
serviced by bank A presented her card to a merchant serviced by bank B, the two banks had to 
have agreement on many issues in order to execute the transaction, even if that meant 
following custom or a default rule. One set of issues concerned which party bore various 
risks—nonpayment by the cardholder, non-delivery of goods by the merchant, bankruptcy of 
the merchant or, for that matter, of the merchant’s bank. Another issue was how much the 
issuer and acquirer were compensated for executing a transaction that could not take place 
without participation by both of them. 
As noted above, when Bank of America began franchising, its first response to this 
problem was a rule stipulating that whenever acquiring bank A and issuing bank B were 
different, A was to send the full amount of its merchant discount to B (and, of course, B was 
                                                 
29 In fact, in the Rochet-Tirole model, which assumes a particular demand structure, the Ramsey price structure, 
like the profit-maximizing price structure, is completely independent of group-specific marginal costs. See 
Rochet and Tirole 2003b, pp. 997-998.  
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to reciprocate when one of its merchants dealt with one of A’s cardholders). Presumably the 
idea was that if all banks adopted similar price structures, then to a first approximation typical 
bank A’s merchant/consumer revenue mix would not depend on whether its cardholders dealt 
with its merchants or with those acquired by other banks. If this had worked, the system could 
have maintained a merchant-centered (or any other) price structure. But, as we observed 
above, this device failed—both because it reduced everyone’s incentives to sign up merchants 
and because it invited deception.  
In the early cooperatives, some banks entered into bilateral agreements with each 
other; this was possible when the systems had few members. But ultimately the cooperatives 
decided to develop a default set of rules, or contracts, that defined the allocation of risks and 
payments. In NBI—the cooperative that evolved from the BankAmericard franchise system 
and was the predecessor of Visa—as long as an acquirer’s merchant met certain terms, such 
as properly authorizing transactions and checking card numbers against a list of known 
fraudulent accounts, it was guaranteed payment. If a transaction turned out to be fraudulent or 
a consumer failed to pay, the issuer was responsible. Various procedures were also set up to 
resolve disputes between merchants and cardholders as to the validity of particular charges. 
MasterCharge—MasterCard’s predecessor—developed a similar contract with a similar 
interchange fee. 
Both contracts were presumably the result of a bargain struck within the cooperative 
organizations between members with different stakes in acquiring and issuing (although back 
then there was less specialization on this dimension than there later came to be). Given the 
payment card industry at the time, the price structure that resulted from these interchange fees 
was similar to that of the unitary systems, although the price levels were lower. Since the 
interchange fee was a cost to the acquirer it was passed on to merchants as part of merchant 
discounts. The resulting merchant discounts were lower, however, than those charged by 
American Express at the time. The issuers then chose to issue cards with modest access fees 
                                                                                                                                                        
30 This discussion in this section is based on Evans and Schmalensee 2005, pp. 153-156. 
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and slightly negative transaction fees for cardholders.31 Unlike the charge-card systems, of 
course, the credit cards came bundled with longer-term financing. For transactions, the 
resulting percentages of revenue that the multi-party systems earned from the merchant side 
were similar to those of American Express and Diners Club, if not higher. 
A. Alternatives to Interchange  
What might the early multi-lateral card systems have done instead? Some have argued 
that for competition policy reasons, bilateral negotiations should have been used to set the 
terms of two-bank transactions rather than collective action.32 This argument seems farfetched 
for the early cooperatives. They had no collective market power by any measure, and it seems 
more plausible that the interchange fee was, as advertised, devised to reduce the transactions 
costs of entering into bilateral negotiations. Moreover, as we noted above, the NaBanco court 
found that bilateral negotiations were not a practical solution in systems with many banks, 
both because of transactions costs and because the honor-all-cards gave issuers substantial 
leverage over acquirers.33 As long as an honor-all-cards rule is in effect, so that merchants are 
required to accept all cards of a given brand, an acquirer is at a significant disadvantage in 
negotiations with other issuing banks, since its merchant is required to accept their cards, but 
it has no guarantee of payment by the card issuer. A guarantee of payment is possible only 
when the terms of payment, including the interchange fee, if any, are specified. Because of 
this asymmetry, there is no reason to believe that bilateral negotiation would generally lead to 
                                                 
31 At least through most of the 1970s, annual fees for Visa and MasterCard cards were relatively uncommon. 
National Bancard Corporation v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., p. 27.  
32 E.g., this was one of the remedies proposed by NaBanco. National Bancard Corporation v. Visa U.S.A., Inc. 
1984, p. 1241. 
33 A recent analysis (Small and Wright 2000) concludes that, at least under certain somewhat special 
assumptions, even if transactions costs were low enough to make bilateral negotiations practical in large systems, 
banks’ strategic behavior would undermine the system’s viability. It is worth noting, though, that the terms of 
two-bank transactions in the Australian EFTPOS system (a PIN-based debit card system) are set exclusively by 
bilateral negotiation; see Reserve Bank of Australia 2004. There are only 11 acquirers and 150 issuers in the 
EFTPOS system; these numbers, while nontrivial, are orders of magnitude lower than the thousands of issuers 
and (at least) hundreds of acquirers in, e.g., the Visa system in the United States. See Reserve Bank of Australia 
2005a, pp. 4, 40-45. Wright and Weiner 2005 report that interchange fees are also set by bilateral negotiation in 
Sweden. Banking concentration is quite high in Sweden, with the top four banks accounting for over 80 percent 
of total assets in 2003. See Swedish Bankers’ Association 2004. By contrast, the top four banks in the United 
States accounted for only a 24 percent share in 2002. See United States Census Bureau 2004. 
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lower average interchange fees or merchant discounts than multilateral action at the 
association level. 
Others have argued that the interchange fee should simply have been set at zero by 
competition authorities or some agency. Credit card paper would then exchange “at par,” like 
checks in the United States.34 One can raise several questions about this proposal. First, a zero 
interchange fee would result in lower prices for merchants (since acquirers would not have the 
interchange fee cost) and higher prices for cardholders (since issuers would not have this 
source of revenue). Although this might seem “fair” in a philosophical sense, there is no basis 
in the economics of two-sided industries for presuming that this pricing structure is more—or 
less—efficient than one that, like the structures adopted by the unitary systems, imposes 
higher prices on merchants. That is, without further information there is nothing economically 
special about an interchange fee of “0”; there is no economic basis for concluding that an 
interchange fee of “0” is better or worse for society than any randomly chosen positive or 
negative percentage.35 
Second, setting the interchange fee at zero imposes a particular price structure on the 
system, one in which side-specific prices are tightly linked to side-specific costs. For 
example, had the predecessors of MasterCard and Visa had a zero interchange fee in the early 
1970s, they would have had to raise card fees by $4.88 per account (or about $18 in 2004 
dollars) to compensate for the loss of interchange fee revenues.36 Imposing less pricing 
flexibility on the emerging cooperative card systems in the early 1970s would have 
necessarily placed them at a competitive disadvantage relative to the more established unitary 
systems, which could choose their price structures without constraints. This distortion in 
competition between unitary and multi-party systems would need to be weighed against 
whatever benefits policymakers believe would arise from mandating exchange at par. 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Frankel 1998 and Balto 2000 and, for a rebuttal, Ahlborn et al. 2001. 
35 Interchange payments in the Australian EFTPOS system flow from issuers to acquirers; see Reserve Bank of 
Australia 2004. Negative interchange fees of this sort existed in some online debit card systems in the United 
States until 1997 and remain the norm in U.S. ATM systems; see Hayashi et al. 2003. 
36 Calculated from data provided by Visa U.S.A. Card fee converted to real 2004 dollars using the GDP implicit 
price deflator from United States Department of Commerce 2004.  
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One also has to consider what other changes might result from a zero interchange fee. 
It is possible that a multi-party system is not even viable with the pricing structure that would 
result from a zero interchange fee.37 In their early days, the viability of these systems was 
very much an open question. Even today, large numbers of issuers might move to other card 
systems (possibly new ones) that are organized so as to be able to replace interchange revenue 
without regulatory or antitrust scrutiny. (Consider, for instance, franchise arrangements with 
for-profit unitary systems in which merchant discounts and payments to issuers are set 
unilaterally by the system.) It is not clear that the pricing structure from such systems would 
be more favorable to merchants. Another possible effect of a zero interchange fee would be to 
change the other terms of the contract among member banks. For example, rules governing 
disputes among issuers and acquirers might be made more favorable toward issuers in order to 
avoid issuer defections. Or the circumstances under which payment is guaranteed to acquirers 
might become more limited.  
B. The Baxter Analysis 
William Baxter addressed the issue of system viability in his pioneering analysis of 
interchange fees.38 His was also the first paper of which we are aware that showed an 
understanding of the two-sided nature of payment systems—or, indeed, of any market. As we 
will see, although his model is special and unrealistic in some respects, it provides important 
insights. 
Baxter assumed perfect competition among issuers, among acquirers, and everywhere 
else in the economy, and, like almost all the subsequent literature, he assumed away all fixed 
costs and access prices. Under these conditions, collective determination of the interchange 
fee cannot be an exercise of market power, since there is no market power anywhere in the 
economy. It is simply a payment from one set of perfectly competitive firms, which will have 
to raise their (variable) prices to cover it, to another set of perfectly competitive firms, which 
will lower their (variable) prices so as to compete it away completely. The interchange fee 
                                                 
37 We illustrate this point in a simple model immediately below. 
38 Baxter 1983. 
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thus can only affect the price structure, not the price level. Baxter assumed that consumers 
and merchants would use a particular payment card if and only if the per-transaction price 
charged to them was less than the per-transaction benefit from using the card rather than cash 
or check. 
To see the role of the interchange fee in ensuring system viability in this setup, 
suppose for simplicity that all consumers have the same per-transaction benefits and that so 
do all merchants. Let the per-transaction prices charged by the card system to consumers and 
merchants be Pc and Pm, respectively; let the corresponding per-transaction benefits relative to 
cash or check be Bc and Bm; and suppose the constant per-transaction marginal cost of serving 
a consumer is Cc and of serving a merchant is Cm. Under these assumptions, it is efficient to 
use the card for all transactions if and only if 
(1)    (Bc + Bm) ≥ (Cc + Cm). 
With a zero interchange fee and perfect competition, consumers will agree to use the card and 
issuers will break even if 
(2)     Bc ≥ Pc = Cc, 
And merchants will agree to accept the card and acquirers will break even if  
(3)     Bm ≥ Pm = Cm. 
For a zero-interchange system to be viable, both (2) and (3) must be satisfied. It is easy to find 
numerical examples in which (1) is satisfied, but either (2) or (3) is not. Suppose, for 
instance:39 
(4)   Bc=1, Bm=8, Cc=3, and Cm=2. 
Here total per-transaction benefits from using the card are almost double the corresponding 
cost, but there is no price to consumers that satisfies (2). In this example retailers receive the 
most benefits if the card is used, and it would be logical for them to cover most of the 
system’s costs. But there is no way to accomplish this with a zero interchange fee. An 
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interchange fee of 2 solves the problem. This raises the acquirer’s cost and (because of perfect 
competition among acquirers) the merchant discount, Pm, to 4, and it lowers the issuer’s cost 
and (because of perfect competition among issuers) the consumers’ fee to 1. Merchants 
contribute 80 percent of the system’s revenue but are better off by 4 per transaction, while 
consumers are just indifferent to the card’s existence even though the positive interchange fee 
has reduced their fees substantially. 
By assumption, the costs incurred by both sides are necessary to execute a transaction. 
If this assumption is correct, it makes no sense to think of either side as providing particular 
services to the other; both must incur all the costs stated for either to benefit. Moreover, there 
is no way for regulators to look only at cost conditions and conclude that an interchange fee of 
2 is appropriate. Even in this simplest possible example, demand conditions must be 
considered. It could happen, of course, that some cost-based formula produced an interchange 
fee of 2. But this could only happen by chance.  
In Baxter’s model, the interchange fee is not set to maximize profits, since there are no 
profits earned anywhere in the payment system. He argued that its level was determined 
uniquely by the need to balance the supply and demand of card transactions. This seems 
somewhat artificial, since as long as some merchants have agreed to accept a card, the volume 
of transactions is determined unilaterally by card-carrying consumers’ deciding whether or 
not to use the card for particular transactions. Nonetheless, the proposition that at some 
interchange fee levels the system would not be viable is likely to hold in more general models. 
The important—and robust—insight from Baxter’s analysis, although it is not framed 
precisely this way, is that the interchange fee helps internalize an externality between the two 
customer groups and in so doing has the potential of making both customer groups better off. 
C. Imperfect Competition in Issuing and Acquiring 
The assumption of perfect competition between homogeneous issuers and acquirers is 
not realistic and leads to most interesting questions having indeterminate answers—since 
                                                                                                                                                        
39 This example is from Rochet 2003, where this model is instructively explored in more detail. 
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there are no profits to be had, there is no motivation for doing anything. The next logical step 
was taken by Richard Schmalensee.40 He made the standard assumption that, except for the 
payment system under study, the economy was perfectly competitive.41 This implies that the 
demand system facing the system, which Schmalensee took as given and did not derive from 
first principles, could be used for standard welfare analysis. Schmalensee allowed for 
imperfect competition among issuers and/or among acquirers and made a particular 
assumption about the functional form of the demand system and thus about the structure of 
indirect network effects. As in the Baxter analysis, the system itself was assumed to operate 
like the Visa and MasterCard systems operate in fact, on a break-even basis, and fixed costs 
and access prices were again assumed away. Thus, as in the numerical example above, the 
interchange fee simply shifts costs between issuers and acquirers, raising costs on one side of 
the market by exactly as much as it lowers costs on the other side.  
In this model the level of the interchange fee can affect the profits earned by issuing 
and acquiring banks whenever competition among them is imperfect, making it possible to 
compare profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing fees. Under some special assumptions 
the comparison is simple: when there is a single issuer and a single acquirer and demand 
curves are linear, for instance, Schmalensee shows that the profit-maximizing interchange fee 
also maximizes system output and economic welfare. In this case regulation could only 
reduce overall performance. In general, however, these three fees may be different even under 
the particular demand structure Schmalensee assumed, and even when the further assumption 
of linear demand is imposed. Thus, even under strong assumptions about demands and costs, 
the relations among these quantities is complex and depends on demand parameters, cost 
conditions, and, an element not present in analysis of unitary two-sided platforms, the nature 
of competition among issuers and among acquirers. 
In the Schmalensee model the interchange fee is not an ordinary market price: it is a 
balancing device for shifting costs between issuers and acquirers and thus shifting charges 
                                                 
40 Schmalensee 2002. 
41 Much of the subsequent literature has persuasively called that standard assumption into question in this 
context, as we discuss in the next section. Nonetheless, it is instructive to see its implications before considering 
how it might be altered in the direction of greater realism. 
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between consumers and merchants.42 Fixing the interchange fee is quite unlike fixing a price 
in a typical one-sided market. The first-order effect of ordinary price-fixing is to harm 
consumers by restricting output. The first-order effect of collective determination of 
interchange fees in this model is generally to enhance the value of the system by balancing 
participation of the two customer groups, thus internalizing indirect externalities. This is 
illustrated most clearly by the existence of a special case, noted above, in which collective 
determination of the interchange fee in order to maximize profit also maximizes output and 
economic welfare. And even in Schmalensee’s simple model, the socially optimal interchange 
fee depends on costs, demand conditions, competition among issuers and among acquirers, 
and externalities between merchants and consumers. Thus as a practical matter, there is no 
rule for regulatory determination of the interchange fee that could be relied on to improve 
overall system performance and thus enhance economic efficiency. 
                                                 
42 In addition, the interchange fee can be used to shift profits between issuers and acquirers, though when it is 
used for that purpose total system profit is necessarily reduced. 
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IV. Second-Best Interchange Fee Analysis 
Except for Schmalensee, most writers on interchange assume some market distortion 
in addition to imperfect competition among issuers and/or acquirers. In these models social 
welfare analysis cannot generally be based on the demand system facing issuers and 
acquirers, and that demand system is derived from more fundamental assumptions rather than 
assumed as in the Schmalensee paper. These authors then generally examine how the 
additional distortion they consider affects the relation between the profit-maximizing and 
welfare-maximizing interchange fees. Almost all assume away fixed costs and access pricing 
and assume that all revenues flow from variable prices. When used to consider regulatory 
policy, these models become exercises in the economics of the second best.43 That is, they 
consider policy in the presence of multiple, interacting departures from the competitive ideal. 
In general, such exercises rarely yield tractable rules that can be used to design practical 
policies. The interchange literature, which points to many additional distortions but typically 
considers them one at a time, provides no exceptions.44 
A. Imperfect Competition Among Merchants 
In a very influential paper that was the first analysis of interchange to derive system 
demand functions from first principles, Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole allowed for 
imperfect competition among merchants.45 They assumed perfect competition among 
acquirers and, for simplicity, identical merchants. They also assumed that some fraction of 
consumers was more likely to patronize merchants who accepted cards, so that merchants had 
a strategic incentive to accept cards in order to avoid losing the economic profits they would 
earn from selling to those consumers. Thus, in contrast to Baxter’s model, because of this 
strategic, rent-seeking incentive, merchants would find it optimal to accept cards even if 
transactions using them were somewhat more expensive than transactions using cash. 
                                                 
43 Lipsey and Lancaster 1956. 
44 For surveys of some of the literature discussed here, see Chakravorti 2003, Hunt 2003, Rochet 2003, Rochet 
and Tirole 2003a, and Schmalensee 2003. 
45 In an influential review of the literature undertaken for the Reserve Bank of Australia, Katz 2001 stressed the 
effects of such competition. See also Wright 2003c and Hayashi 2004. 
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Since all profits in this model system are earned by issuers, the profit-maximizing 
interchange fee is the highest fee consistent with all merchants accepting the card. This may 
be equal to the socially optimal fee, but it may be higher because competition forces 
merchants to internalize part of the benefits of cardholders. In the former case card usage is 
welfare-maximizing, but in the latter case it is excessive, since an interchange fee that is too 
high drives consumer variable fees too low and thus stimulates excessive card usage by 
consumers.46 No cost-based or other simple rule for regulating the interchange fee reliably 
solves this problem, however, even in this bare-bones model. 
The result that a profit-maximizing system never sets an interchange fee below the 
welfare-maximizing level in the Rochet-Tirole model, which seems to underpin some current 
regulatory initiatives, depends critically on the very strong assumption that merchants are 
identical. Julian Wright shows that if this assumption is relaxed and even if consumers know 
which merchants accept cards (so merchants’ rent-seeking incentive to take cards is 
maximized), the profit-maximizing interchange fee may be above or below the welfare-
maximizing level, and there may thus be too many card transactions or too few.47 The relation 
between profit-maximizing and welfare-maximizing fee levels in this more general model is 
complex and depends on details of demand and competitive conditions as well as costs. 
B. Reducing the Transactions Costs of Borrowing 
Credit cards bundle the provision of credit with transaction processing. In so doing 
they reduce the transactions costs of borrowing on the part of cardholders, so that cardholders 
can buy on credit more easily. Through the development of sophisticated risk scoring 
methods, credit cards may also have relaxed the overall liquidity constraints that many 
consumers face. In addition, charge cards provide short-term liquidity, albeit only for a couple 
of weeks on average, and debit and charge cards reduce the transaction costs of obtaining 
funds from alternative sources. If a merchant’s decision to accept cards induces consumers 
                                                 
46 It is worth noting that De Grauwe and Rinaldi 2002 have developed a model involving rent-seeking by 
merchants in which the level of card usage is below the welfare-maximizing level. They treat merchants’ 
decisions to accept or not accept cards as exogenous, however. 
47 Wright 2004a. 
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sometimes to spend more than they otherwise would because of these reductions in 
consumers’ transactions costs, merchants have another incentive to accept payment cards, 
over and above their own transaction cost savings and the rent-seeking incentive discussed 
above.48 There is also at least anecdotal evidence that these are benefits that merchants receive 
at lower cost from general purpose payment cards than they could have provided themselves 
through store card programs. Many smaller retailers dropped store cards as credit cards 
became more widely held, and few retailers steer customers to their own store cards anymore. 
It is hard to evaluate the welfare implications of providing increased liquidity. 
Relaxing liquidity constraints and reducing transaction costs clearly benefit consumers. The 
more merchants that accept cards, the larger these benefits. A rigorous analysis would need 
also to consider the sources of both liquidity constraints and transaction costs, however, and 
we are not aware of any empirical or theoretical analysis that even attempts to do this.  
C. Competition Among Payment Systems 
In the United States, payment card systems compete against cash and checks as well as 
each other. The production of cash is a government activity, subsidized through the Federal 
budget. And cash users do not fully internalize some of the social costs of using it, such as 
crime against merchants. The check system in the US is run by the Federal Reserve, which 
essentially forced banks early in the last century to exchange checks at par—that is, to have a 
zero interchange fee in the checking system.49 The price structure in this competing system is 
thus not fully market-determined. Similarly, outside the United States, governments have 
commonly influenced the evolution of Giro (a payment system in which a bank or a post 
office transfers money from one account to another when it receives authorization to do so) 
and related transactional systems. 
There is no rigorous analysis of which we are aware of the effects of government-
determined pricing in these competing systems on pricing in payment card systems. It is 
worth noting, for instance, that a large fraction of consumers in the United States and Western 
                                                 
48 Chakravorti and To 2003. See also Chakravorti and Emmons 2003 and Wright 2000. 
49 Chang and Evans 2000; for an alternative view, see Frankel 1998. 
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Europe pay no variable fees for writing checks, primarily as a result of the decision by banks 
to bundle this service (and ATM/debit cards) with the general banking relationship. This 
might explain why credit and charge card systems have generally not imposed transaction-
specific variable fees on consumers. Similarly, there has been no analysis of which we are 
aware that considers the impact of this sort of competition on the relationship between profit-
maximizing and welfare-optimizing interchange fee levels.  
The existing literature does contain a number of (generally complex) analyses of 
competition between payment systems or between two-sided platforms in general.50 It is fair 
to say that this work is at an early stage. It seems clear that the nature of consumer and 
merchant behavior shapes the competitive price structure, and that there is no general 
tendency for competition between platforms to make the price structure closer or farther from 
the social optimum, though competition will generally tend to lower the price level. Suppose, 
for instance, that consumers all have multiple cards (this is termed “multi-homing” in the 
literature) and are indifferent among them, and that merchants can effectively persuade 
consumers which card to use. In this case competing systems will have an extra incentive to 
compete for merchants’ favor, and this will cause a tilt in the price structure against 
consumers that may or may not improve performance. Similarly, if consumers tend to use 
only one card (to “single-home”) while merchants find it easy to accept all cards, competing 
systems will have an extra incentive to attract consumers, and the price structure will be tilted 
in their favor accordingly. These aspects of consumer and retailer behavior have received 
little empirical study, however.51 
D. Barriers to Surcharging 
In the United States and, at least until recently, elsewhere, payment card systems seem 
to have generally required merchants that accept their cards to agree not to impose a surcharge 
                                                 
50 See Armstrong 2004 and 2005, Armstrong and Wright 2004, Chakravorti and Rosson 2004, Gabszewicz and 
Wauthy 2004, Guthrie and Wright 2003, Manenti and Somma 2003, Rochet and Tirole 2002 and 2003b,  
51 Rysman 2004 finds that most U.S. consumers carry multiple cards but tend to concentrate their purchases on 
only one, suggesting a weak form of single-homing. It is unclear what combination of preferences, costs, and 
merchant behavior this finding reflects, however, or how much a typical consumer prefers her primary card over 
others she carries. 
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on consumers who use those cards. At first blush, this no-surcharge rule (NSR) would appear 
to be an artificial distortion likely to reduce performance. Dennis Carlton and Alan Frankel 
were the first to observe that, in a fully competitive system (a la Baxter), if there is no NSR, 
and if it costs merchants nothing to charge different prices to consumers depending on what 
payment system they use, the interchange fee will be irrelevant and card usage will be 
efficient.52 If acquirers are perfectly competitive, an increase in the interchange fee is passed 
along dollar for dollar to the merchant discount, and perfect competition among merchants 
means that the merchant discount is passed along dollar for dollar to card-using consumers 
(and not at all to those who pay with cash). On the other side of the market, competition 
among issuers means that the increase in interchange is passed to card-users, dollar for dollar, 
in reduced fees. Thus card-using consumers pay the full cost of the system regardless of the 
interchange fee, and, if they also bear the full costs of all other payment systems, they will use 
payment cards if and only if they are socially less costly. Accordingly, Carlton and Frankel 
advocate abolishing NSRs. 
It turns out that the Carlton-Frankel assumptions are stronger than necessary for the 
interchange fee to be irrelevant in the absence of an NSR. What is required is only costless 
surcharging—i.e., the ability of merchants at no cost to charge different prices depending on 
the means of payment used.53 But without perfect competition everywhere, abolishing an 
NSR does not generally lead to an efficient outcome. In particular, imperfect competition 
among issuers then tends to lead to under-provision of card services, and merchants could use 
surcharges as a mechanism for price discrimination. Economic welfare may be lower than at 
the profit-maximizing equilibrium with an NSR—even if card usage is excessive in the latter 
case. In the murky realm of the second-best, this sort of ambiguity is not uncommon.  
Moreover, it is clear that the assumption of costless surcharging is unrealistically 
strong; most merchants do not discriminate among people using different means of payment 
even when they are not prevented from doing so. For instance, it has generally been 
permissible for U.S. merchants to give a discount for cash purchases and, though this was 
                                                 
52 Carlton and Frankel 1995a and 1995b; see also Evans and Schmalensee 1995. 
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done for a time at gasoline stations, it is now extremely rare.54 In the Netherlands about 10 
percent of merchants imposed surcharges when they were allowed.55 In the United Kingdom, 
surcharges are permitted for credit and charge cards but surcharging is uncommon.56 And 
when NSRs were abolished in Sweden, only about 5 percent of merchants imposed 
surcharges.57 Although we are not aware of any concrete data yet from the elimination of 
NSRs in Australia,58 our understanding from colleagues there is that the prevalence of 
surcharging, at least to date, is likely in line with these other experiences. The one instance we 
are aware of with a somewhat higher incidence of surcharging, although still far from 
pervasive, was in Denmark, where earlier this year, 19 percent of merchants (primarily 
grocery retailers) passed a new 0.55 Kroner debit card surcharge through to consumers.59 
We suspect merchants are reluctant to impose surcharges for two reasons. The first is 
that there are transaction costs of imposing different prices based on payment methods. The 
second is that consumers may prefer to patronize stores that do not surcharge. No analysis of 
which we are aware has considered or attempted to measure these costs and preferences. 
There is nothing unusual here, of course: there are many things that merchants could 
surcharge for—because they entail specific costs that are caused by particular customers—and 
do not.60 Parking in shopping malls is an obvious example. 
E. Implications 
The quantity of recent theoretical literature discussed in this section makes it clear that 
economists find interchange fees fascinating. Almost all of these papers find that profit-
maximizing interchange fees are unlikely to be socially optimal, but none yields workable 
                                                                                                                                                        
53 See Rochet and Tirole 2002, Wright 2003a, and, especially, Gans and King 2003b. Schwartz and Vincent 
2004 provide a related analysis for a unitary system. 
54 Chakravorti 2003, p. 55. 
55 ITM Research 2000. 
56 Office of Fair Trading 2003b, pp. 114-115.  
57 IMA Market Development AB 2000, p. 18; but see Katz 2001, p. 44. 
58 For example, the Reserve Bank of Australia notes that “some merchants” have started surcharging but that 
“there are no comprehensive data.” Reserve Bank of Australia 2004, p. 11. 
59 The Danish competition authority had announced that it was going to investigate whether there had been any 
collective action by grocery stores. Konkurrencestyrelsen 2005. 
60 See, for example, Evans and Schmalensee 2005, p. 131.  
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rules for welfare-improving regulatory intervention. (In particular, none points to the 
optimality of any rule that is purely cost-based.) Moreover, these models are highly stylized. 
A variety of market imperfections are considered one at a time; not only are some visible 
imperfections not considered at all (e.g., government-determined zero interchange in U.S. 
checking), no analyst has even attempted to consider them all together. Most papers assume 
consumers are faced with variable (i.e., transaction-specific) charges, even though most 
systems do not impose such charges and rely instead on annual fees and other access charges. 
Finally, there has been essentially no empirical work devoted to testing any of these models or 
to measuring the importance of any of the effects they predict. This literature, in short, is not 
very useful for either rationalizing or designing a system of interchange fee regulation. Of 
course, for exactly the same reasons, it is not capable of proving that the interchange fees 
determined by the card associations are exactly or approximately socially optimal. 
It is useful to compare the results for interchange fees for payment cards with some 
other business practices that economists have analyzed. In many ways the theoretical results 
surveyed here are similar to those for advertising, research and development, product design, 
product variety, location decisions, firm entry in the presence of fixed costs, bundling, and 
price discrimination.61 In all these cases economic models show that the profit-maximizing 
result under imperfect competition may deviate from the social welfare-maximizing result. 
However, in most cases the bias can go in either direction, and in all cases determining the 
socially optimal result depends on complex factors that cannot be measured in practice. Based 
on our review of the theoretical literature on interchange fees to date there does not seem to be 
any basis for concluding that the potential distortions caused by collective determination of 
interchange fees are any more—or any less—significant than the potential distortions caused 
by these other deviations from the ideal model of perfect competition. 
                                                 
61 See, generally, Tirole 1988. 
29 
V. Government Determination of Interchange Fees 
Traditionally, government control of prices and conditions of service—either via 
government ownership or economic regulation—has been most prevalent in network public 
utility sectors, such as water, electricity, telephone, and gas. Firms in these sectors were 
traditionally local monopolists. The stated purpose of regulation or government ownership in 
these sectors was to protect consumers from prices that would otherwise reflect the exercise 
of monopoly power and thus, as every student of basic economics should be able to explain, 
would be too high. As all of those students should also know, efficient prices in these sectors 
are based on marginal costs, with socially optimal markups above marginal cost depending on 
demand conditions. However, the global movement toward privatization, deregulation, and 
incentive regulation reflected an emerging consensus that even in these near-textbook cases, 
economic welfare was in practice not reliably improved by government ownership or price 
regulation.62 Politics inevitably intrudes into government price-setting, for instance, and 
limitations on profit rates tend to lead to waste and inefficiency. 
Experience with government control of prices has taught analysts that a persuasive 
economic case for price regulation requires a positive answer to two questions:  
1. Is the performance of the market or markets being considered substantially sub-
optimal?  
2. Is there a practical regulatory policy that is reasonably certain to improve market 
performance substantially?  
Since regulation is a blunt policy instrument in practice, unless there is a substantial market 
failure there is scant chance that regulation will reliably improve matters. And unless there is 
a known, practical regulatory rule that, if followed, is reasonably certain to improve 
performance, it is likely that regulation will be on balance harmful. At least in theory, there is 
no economic point to interfering with even imperfect markets unless those imperfections are 
serious and capable of correction by known methods. 
                                                 
62 See, for instance, Armstrong et al. 1994, Megginson and Netter 2001, and Littlechild 2003. In the United 
States, price cap regulation has been used as an alternative to rate of return regulation by the FCC and some 
states in regulating telephone companies starting in the 1980s. Viscusi et al. 2000, Chapter 12. This approach has 
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A. The First Question: Is There a Significant Market Failure? 
As we have discussed, the growing body of theoretical writing on interchange fees 
establishes that privately optimal fees are unlikely to be socially optimal, but it does not 
indicate whether they will be systematically too high or too low. This literature does not and, 
in the absence of evidence, cannot indicate whether non-optimal interchange fees have a 
significant or trivial effect on overall performance. The related literature on pricing structures 
for two-sided markets reaches a similar result.63 There is no reason to presume that even 
competing two-sided platforms will settle on a price structure that is socially optimal. And, 
for this reason, there is no reason to presume that unitary systems have pricing structures near 
the social optimum. 
Empirical evidence, not theory, therefore must play the leading role in assessing 
whether interchange fees—and the resulting prices to cardholders and merchants—lead to 
significant underprovision or overprovision of payment card services relative to the social 
optimum. In a recent discussion of the rationale for regulation of interchange in Australia, I.J. 
Macfarlane, Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, similarly stresses the results of a 
factual inquiry rather than the deductions of economic theorists:64 
…we saw that credit cards were growing faster than the other means of 
payment. This was initially somewhat surprising as credit card transactions are 
more expensive than most other means of payment—that is, they involve a 
larger payment from the users of the payments system to the providers of the 
payments system. … Why was this possible? 
Governor Macfarlane poses almost the right question: Are payment system usage 
patterns significantly inconsistent with system costs—and, it is essential to add, benefits? 
There is nothing unusual about a high-cost product driving out cheaper competition if the 
high-cost product is much better. U.S. drivers generally prefer automatic to manual 
transmissions in their automobiles, for instance, even though automatic transmissions cost 
                                                                                                                                                        
been very widely used outside the United States. Winston and Morrison 1986 document some of the adverse 
effects of airline regulation in the US. 
63 It is worth noting one difference explicitly. Both profit- and welfare-maximizing interchange fees depend in 
general on the nature of competition among issuers and among acquirers, and this additional complexity is not 
present in the analysis of ordinary, unitary two-sided platform businesses. 
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more and are more expensive to maintain. Drivers seem to believe the difference in benefits 
outweighs the difference in cost.65 
 In our context, U.S. banks typically charge consumers the same variable price for 
handling a check as for handling a signature-based debit card payment: zero. Debit cards are 
nonetheless rapidly replacing checks because consumers find them more convenient. 
An approach that is based on careful measurement of costs and benefits has the 
potential to distinguish what is important from what is only a theoretical possibility. Dealing 
with quantitative evidence rather than qualitative possibilities can also inform regulatory 
policies if regulation is deemed appropriate. Since the objective of interchange-fee regulation, 
where it is warranted, should be to correct the effects of a distortion of price signals, it is 
important to get a quantitative sense of the importance of those effects. Let us, accordingly, 
turn to the available evidence. 
Some studies have argued that payment cards are used too much, based on the 
observation that they are more expensive on average for merchants than cash and checks but 
are nevertheless increasing in use at the expense of cash and checks.66 While this is intuitively 
appealing, it ignores both cardholders and the role of benefits in determining the social 
optimum. 
To see this, consider a simple economy with only cash and cards and with a fixed set 
of transactions to be executed. For each transaction, one can in principle compute the social 
marginal cost of executing the transaction using cash—the sum of the marginal costs to the 
merchant and consumer involved, as well as the net costs to all other involved parties, 
including governments and commercial banks. One can similarly compute the social marginal 
cost of executing each transaction using cards, along with the social marginal benefit of using 
cards as opposed to cash—the sum of the marginal benefits to consumers, merchants, 
                                                                                                                                                        
64 Macfarlane 2005. 
65 Similarly, as Joanna Stavins pointed out in a paper on electronic check truncation and presentment, bicycles 
may be cheaper than cars but that does not mean that society would necessarily be better off if bicycles replaced 
cars. Stavins 1997, p. 28. 
66 See, for example, Balto 2000 and Reserve Bank of Australia 2002. 
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governments, and commercial banks.67 The marginal benefit in any of these cases may be 
negative, of course; consumers may find cards less convenient than cash for very small 
transactions, for instance. In this simple case the efficient outcome is clearly for cash to be 
used for transactions for which the social marginal cost of using cash is less than the net social 
marginal cost of using cards—the social marginal cost of using cards minus the social 
marginal benefit of using cards rather than cash—and for cards to be used for the others. 
Transactions-specific marginal costs and benefits are in principle necessary to assess the 
importance (i.e., the net social cost) of any deviation from this ideal. Considering only costs 
and only one of the parties involved cannot be very informative. 
To our knowledge, there are no empirical studies in the literature that consider the 
marginal social costs and benefits for merchants and cardholders, and thus there are no 
comparisons of actual versus optimal use of alternative payment systems that have even 
approximate economic validity. There is some evidence on marginal costs for merchants, 
some highly incomplete evidence on marginal benefits for merchants, and essentially nothing 
on marginal costs or benefits for cardholders or other parties.68 
Garcia Swartz, Hahn, and Layne-Farrar provide a useful overview of much of the 
available evidence, examine some of the issues one would need to consider in evaluating 
whether an economy has roughly the socially optimal use of payment cards, and present some 
rough calculations based on available data and some plausible assumptions about consumer 
benefits for a few transactions sizes and types.69 They take the merchant-based cost surveys as 
a point of departure but then proceed to make three types of adjustments. First, merchant-
based surveys of costs usually compare payment instruments at different transaction sizes, 
typically the average transaction size for each payment instrument. The authors depart from 
this norm and compare payment instruments at a set of fixed transaction sizes, small and 
large, to assess the sensitivity of their results. Second, by combining plausible assumptions 
                                                 
67 For consumers, benefits would be measured by changes in consumers’ surplus; for the other entities the 
measure would generally be changes in rents. 
68 Compare, for instance, Humphrey et al. 2003, which argues that electronic payments systems are inherently 
socially more efficient, and Food Marketing Institute 1998, which argues that payment cards impose excessive 
costs on grocers.  
69 Garcia Swartz et al. 2004. 
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with available data they attempt to incorporate all other parties to the transaction—consumers, 
the government, and commercial banks—into the calculation of cost and benefits. Finally, 
they consider the benefits received by the cardholder and merchants; as a result they compare 
the “net” cost of payment methods. Garcia Swartz, Hahn, and Layne-Farrar present rough 
estimates of these magnitudes and find that the optimal payment method (considering 
quantifiable costs and benefits) varies by transaction size, store type, and other circumstances. 
For many transactions it appears that credit and debit cards do not have higher “net costs” 
than cash or checks. While this work is instructive, however, it falls well short of a rigorous 
overall assessment of payment system performance. 
B. The Second Question: Will Interchange Regulation Help? 
Let us assume that one has shown that it would be socially optimal to reduce the use of 
payment cards in favor of other payment systems. Two further questions would then need to 
be considered. (1) Is the interchange fee the appropriate method for trying to achieve this 
improvement? (A related question is whether the source of the distortion is the collective 
setting of the interchange fee.) (2) If the answer to that question is affirmative then do we 
have a method for regulating the interchange fee that is likely to increase social welfare? 
Since we know that interchange fees can be too high or too low, and either case can lead to a 
distortion, the issue is whether regulators can estimate the optimal interchange fee precisely 
enough to have confidence that they will improve social welfare. 
The first question is more problematic than it might seem at first. As we noted earlier, 
card issuers charge merchants mainly variable fees and charge cardholders both access (i.e., 
fixed) and variable (i.e., transaction-specific) fees. The claim has been that cards are over-
used because issuers—benefiting from and competing away to some extent interchange fee 
revenue—impose too low (possibly negative) variable fees on cardholders. Cardholders, who 
do not bear the costs imposed on the merchant by their choice of payment method, it is thus 
argued, use their cards too much. 
A regulation-mandated reduction in the interchange fee tends to reduce the variable 
fees faced by merchants; if competition in acquiring is sufficiently intense, this reduction is 
one-for-one. However, reducing the interchange fee does not necessarily raise the variable fee 
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paid by cardholders one-for-one—or, indeed, at all. Issuers can respond to the loss of 
interchange fee revenue by varying either fixed or variable fees, or both. The extent to which 
they vary each will depend on a variety of factors including the elasticity of demand for 
access to cards and the elasticity of demand for transactions. In addition, there are likely to be 
one-time costs of various sorts (including costs of changing accounting and billing systems) 
caused by moving from the traditional regime of zero variable charges to a regime with 
positive variable charges. The one-time costs of making reward programs less generous are 
likely to be less significant, if they exist at all. 
Suppose, for instance, that issuers increased annual fees but did not reduce variable 
fees at all. In that extreme case the regulation of the interchange fee would not alter consumer 
incentives to use cards, although it might reduce the average number of cards that people 
carry. (Since it is hard to function in modern economies without at least one payment card, we 
doubt that the fraction of households with zero cards would rise noticeably.) Preliminary data 
from Australia suggests that even though interchange fees were reduced by nearly half in late 
2003, the marginal price to cardholders of using credit cards has not changed much. While 
some reward programs were made somewhat less generous, these cover only a fraction of 
consumers and card transactions,70 and we have not seen widespread evidence of surcharging 
by merchants or the imposition of fees by issuers that increase with card usage.71 So while 
available data suggest that interchange fee reductions were passed through more or less 
completely to reductions in merchant discounts, it does not seem that the stated objective of 
the RBA to make consumers face the “right” variable prices for different payment methods 
                                                 
70 Industry estimates suggest that reward cards constitute about one third to one half of all credit cards in the 
United States; we lack comparable data for Australia. Bayot 2003. 
71 Making some reward programs less generous moved some negative variable prices toward zero. Many of these 
changes were in the form of caps on the total number of rewards points that can be earned each year. These 
limits have been set at relatively high levels, over AUS$40,000 (approximately US$31,000 at the time of this 
writing) a year, and likely have not been a binding constraint for many cardholders. See Reserve Bank of 
Australia 2004, p. 11. There were also some reductions in the marginal reward per dollar spent in some cases. 
There is no reason to think that this would have a big effect on card volume. In fact, if one is accumulating 
points in a rewards program to take a trip, and the rewards program is made less generous so that more purchases 
are required to earn the trip, one might use the card more rather than less intensively. There would be costs of 
various sorts associated with imposing positive transaction fees on non-reward cards, so it is not surprising that 
this does not seem to have been done. 
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was realized to any appreciable extent.72 Consistent with this, the data do not reveal much, if 
any, impact of the reforms on the use of credit cards.73 
All this is not to say that dramatic reductions in the interchange fee had no economic 
effects. Because retailing in Australia is relatively concentrated and thus competition is likely 
to be imperfect,74 it is reasonable to expect that only a fraction of the fall in merchant 
discounts was passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, and the remainder went to 
increasing retailers’ profits. When consumers use cash or credit cards without rewards they 
are better off as a result; when they use cards with reward schemes they are likely worse off. 
We have seen no evidence that these effects can be associated with distinct groups of 
consumers – different income quintiles, for instance. 
On the other side of the market, the best evidence we have been able to obtain 
indicates that issuers have recovered between a third and a half of the fall in interchange 
revenue through increased fees to consumers.75 Thus issuers’ profits have been reduced, and 
consumers with credit cards of all sorts have been directly harmed, particularly if they use 
reward cards. In order to mitigate reductions in MasterCard and Visa interchange revenues, 
                                                 
72 The RBA stated that its reforms were in line with the principle that “consumers should face prices that take 
into account the relative costs of producing goods and services, as well as demand conditions.” Reserve Bank of 
Australia 2002, p. 34. 
73 Credit card dollar volume grew significantly in Australia in the late 1990s. The rate of growth started declining 
following 1999. The rate of decline in the growth rate leveled off in 2003 and 2004, in contrast to an acceleration 
in the rate of decline that would be expected were the reforms to have had a substantial impact. Nonetheless, the 
real dollar volume of credit card purchases rose 20.0 percent between 2002 and 2004, about four times as rapidly 
as real household consumption. Interestingly, the number of credit card accounts grew by 11.1 percent over this 
period, compared to a growth of only 2.6 percent in population. See Reserve Bank of Australia 2005b. 
74 Government statistics on firm concentration are not available. We have identified what data we could find 
from a range of sources. Many merchant categories appear to have significant levels of concentration. For 
example, within their respective categories, the top department store had a 71 percent share (and the top two had 
an 83 percent share) in 2003; the top two supermarket and grocery stores (excluding convenience, specialty and 
miscellaneous food stores) had a 75 percent share in 2003; the top two mobile telephone operators had a 78 
percent share in 2005; the top land-line telephone operator had a 75 percent share in 2005; and the top two 
airlines had an 83 percent share in 2005. In contrast, the four-firm concentration index for these categories is 
significantly lower in the United States based on 2002 U.S. Census data: 65 percent for department stores, 33 
percent for supermarkets and grocery stores, 61 percent for mobile telephone operators, and 60 percent for land-
line telephone operators. The U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics reports the top two firms accounting for 32 
percent of enplaned passengers among major U.S. airlines in 2000. The one merchant category that we found 
with lower concentration was for warehouse clubs and superstores, for which the four-firm concentration index 
in Australia was 41 percent, compared to 92 percent in the United States. See Euromonitor 2005a, Euromonitor 
2005b, Euromonitor 2005c, United States Census Bureau 2004, Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2000, 
Maxwell 2005, and McFarland 2005. 
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three of the top four Australian banks have signed agreements to issue American Express or 
Diners Club cards, which can provide greater, unregulated transaction-related revenues to 
issuing banks.76 In part as a consequence, the shares of these unitary systems have risen, 
though from initially low levels.77  
All in all, it seems that in the short time since interchange fee reductions were imposed 
retailers have been made better off, issuers have been made worse off, and some consumers 
have been made better off (particularly those who tend to use cash a lot) and others have been 
make worse off (particularly those who use credit cards with reward schemes). In the long run 
some of these effects are likely to be undone as consumers and issuing banks move toward 
American Express and Diners Club, as these schemes have substantially higher average 
merchant discounts than the bank card systems.78 
The apparent ineffectiveness of the fairly dramatic Australian regulatory intervention 
in terms of its stated goals may result from the particular competitive environment in that 
country and the types of cards used by consumers. However, it would appear to be generally 
the case that the interchange fee is a highly imprecise instrument for affecting the volume of 
transactions on cards and thus for correcting any perceived market distortion. That is because 
a there is only a loose connection between interchange fees and transactions prices to 
cardholders. 
                                                                                                                                                        
75 See Chang, Evans and Garcia Swartz 2005.  
76 See, e.g., Cornell 2004 and 2005. 
77 Reserve Bank of Australia 2004, p. 13. 
78 Some have argued that reducing the interchange fees of the multi-party systems will put pressure on unitary 
systems to follow suit, but this is not persuasive. To the extent that interchange regulation disadvantages the 
multi-party systems, it reduces competitive pressure on the unitary systems. (We are indebted to Michael Katz 
for this point.) The Reserve Bank of Australia suggests that there has been some downward pressure on 
merchant discounts for American Express and Diners Club in Australia, with a decline of 13 basis points over 
the 12 months ending June 2004 (although it does not discuss whether other factors might have been responsible 
for this), but expresses concern that the gap between the merchant discount for the unitary versus multi-party 
systems had widened by 30 basis points. See Reserve Bank of Australia 2004, pp. 12-13. Given that the 
merchant discounts for the unitary systems were, according to one account, about 100 basis points higher than 
for the multi-party systems (Reserve Bank of Australia 2001, Figure 2.2), even if there is a modest decrease in 
the merchant discounts for multi-party systems attributable to the reforms, the post-reform unitary merchant 
discount would still exceed the pre-reform multi-party merchant discount. And the merchant discount paid on 
volume shifted from the multi-party to the unitary systems would increase. 
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Let us suppose for the sake of argument that regulators went further than any have 
gone in fact and banned the use of consumer access fees. Interchange fee regulations would 
then necessarily affect the transaction price paid by consumers, as they are assumed to do in 
the theoretical literature. (This ban would, of course, likely impose a new set of costs and 
distortions on the system.) There would still be the question whether it is possible to estimate 
the optimal interchange fee with sufficient precision that policymakers could expect to 
increase rather than decrease social welfare. A robust conclusion from the theoretical 
literature is that an estimate of the optimal interchange fee would depend on a host of factors: 
estimates of the price responsiveness of cardholders and merchants, indirect network effects 
between cardholders and merchants, competition in issuing and acquiring and among 
merchants, price distortions in competing payment systems, transactions costs and liquidity 
constraints, and marginal costs of serving cardholders and merchants. It would also depend on 
how competing systems—some of which may be unitary—would respond to changes in 
prices to cardholders and merchants. Because of the difficulty of the task, there are no serious 
attempts of which we are aware to estimate the socially optimal interchange fee for any real 
payment system. Given currently available data and estimation methods, we believe that any 
such attempt could at best yield highly imprecise estimates. 
This task would require far more empirical information than classic public utility 
regulation. Most public utilities have historically been monopolies, so the strategic interaction 
with competitors could be ignored, unregulated prices can be safely presumed to be too high, 
and reducing prices until the utility just breaks even will generally increase economic 
welfare—at least as long as impacts on the utility’s incentives for efficiency are ignored. 
Although sometimes present, network effects rarely played an important role in the analysis, 
and the calculation of optimal (Ramsey) prices required only estimates of marginal costs and 
demand elasticities. However, even in the public utility context it has proved difficult to 
calculate precise estimates of the relevant parameters, and the determination of optimal prices 
has often led to considerable controversy among economists and policymakers. 
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A robust conclusion of the economic literature on interchange fees and two-sided 
markets is that cost-based interchange fees are generally not socially optimal.79 Even if one 
were convinced, as some regulators seem to be, that current interchange fees are too high, 
unlike the public utility case, there is no guarantee that lowering them toward any particular 
target will improve welfare. In particular, there is no basis for believing that any particular 
cost-based formula for determining interchange fees would even provide a first approximation 
to the socially optimal interchange fee. Nor is there any basis at the moment for believing that 
moving from the collectively determined interchange fee to a fee based on any formula that 
considers only costs would be likely to improve social welfare. Unlike the public utility 
situation, therefore, there is no basis in economic theory or fact for cost-based regulation of 
interchange fees such as the regime adopted in Australia or by the European Commission.80 
In both Australia and Europe, the regulators (or at least their economic consultants) 
recognized that socially optimal interchange fees also depend on demand factors or network 
effects but, presumably, decided not to incorporate those factors because of the difficulty of 
doing so, citing instead the “objectivity” and “transparency” benefits of a cost-based 
measure.81 Objectivity and transparency may have benefits, of course, but by themselves they 
do not, necessarily lead to greater economic efficiency. 
Although cost-based interchange fee regulation could by happenstance improve the 
efficiency of the payment system, there are two fundamental reasons to doubt that it would 
regularly do so in practice. The first is that regulating the interchange fee will not necessarily 
have a significant effect on the variable prices paid by cardholders and therefore will not 
necessarily have a significant effect on the volume of transactions—generally the putative 
target of the intervention. The second is that even if regulating the interchange fee could 
                                                 
79 The economic literature appears to be unanimous on this point; examples include Bergman 2005, Gans and 
King 2003a and 2003c (who accept for the purpose of argument the assumption that externalities between 
merchants and consumers are unimportant in mature card systems) and Wright 2003b. 
80 These regulatory schemes have the further peculiarity from an economic standpoint that the merchant discount 
charged by unitary systems is left unregulated while the merchant discount for cooperative systems is regulated 
through cost-based interchange fees. This favors the unitary systems and thus leads to a further economic 
distortion whose effects would need to be considered in evaluating the net social benefits from moving to cost-
based interchange fees. 
81 Reserve Bank of Australia 2002, p. 12; Katz 2001, p. 29; European Commission 2002.  
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affect the variable prices paid by both merchants and cardholders, cost-based regulation is not 
capable of achieving the optimal prices except by happenstance. Whether cost-based 
regulation in practice would increase efficiency is unknown given the current state of 
theoretical and empirical knowledge. 
C. Competition Policy and Interchange Fee Determination 
Relatively early in the development of the payment card industry, the NaBanco court 
recognized the complexity of the role played by the interchange fee and the differences 
between that role and the role of an ordinary price in deciding that interchange fees should be 
evaluated under the rule of reason rather than be subject to the per se condemnation of price-
fixing under U.S. law. We believe the recent theoretical literature supports this approach. 
There is a strong economic presumption that collective determination of ordinary prices 
harms consumers relative to uncoordinated, competitive pricing, but there is no economic 
presumption that collectively setting interchange fees reduces output or consumer welfare as 
compared to any other feasible regime.  
Under U.S. law, to evaluate whether the pro-competitive benefits of collectively set 
interchange fees outweigh the anti-competitive costs (the test under the rule of reason) one 
would presumably have to compare collectively set interchange fees with the results of 
bilateral negotiations among acquirers and issuers.82 As we have discussed, bilateral 
negotiation would at the very least involve high transactions costs in systems, like those in the 
United States, with large numbers of issuers and acquirers, and it may not be feasible in such 
systems. But assume it is feasible, and assume away the associated transactions costs. Then 
one would have to examine whether bilateral negotiations would lead to lower prices and 
higher output than collectively set interchange fees. Existing theory does not provide much 
help in predicting the outcome of such bilateral negotiations,83 and, of course, the arguments 
in favor of interchange regulation imply that the output of credit card systems is already too 
high. Thus there is no reason at all to believe that bilateral negotiations would result in an 
                                                 
82 That is the remedy that was sought by the plaintiff in NaBanco. 
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interchange fee that would be closer to the social optimum than the collectively set 
interchange fee. 
VI. Conclusions 
Economists have only scratched the surface of the theoretical and empirical work that 
will be needed to understand pricing in two-sided markets in general and the determination of 
interchange fees in particular. Like much work in economics, many of the existing theoretical 
models are based on highly simplified representations of the industries in question and 
employ highly special assumptions concerning relevant economic relationships in order to 
isolate individual aspects of interest. Nevertheless, several results have emerged from the 
literature that seem robust enough for policymakers to rely on: 
1. The socially optimal prices for customer groups in multi-sided industries depend 
on price elasticities of demand, indirect network effects between the customer 
groups, marginal costs for providing goods or services to each group, and other 
factors.  
2. Although socially optimal prices in the payment card industry depend on the same 
set of factors, the socially optimal interchange fee also depends on other 
characteristics of these industries that affect the relationship between the 
interchange fee and final prices. Those factors include the use of fixed and variable 
fees, competitive conditions among merchants, issuers, acquirers, and the nature of 
competition from cash, checks, and unitary payment systems. 
3. Thus the socially optimal interchange fee is not in general equal to any interchange 
fee based on cost considerations alone. 
4. One cannot presume on the basis of theory alone that the interchange fee set 
collectively by an association is greater than, less than, or equal to the socially 
optimal interchange fee. 
5. One cannot presume on the basis of theory alone that movements from the 
collectively set interchange fee to any particular cost-based interchange fee will 
increase or decrease social welfare. 
                                                                                                                                                        
83 As we noted above, Small and Wright 2000 conclude bilateral negotiation would threaten system viability, but 
it is unclear how robust this result is. 
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6. One cannot presume on the basis of theory alone that the collectively set 
interchange fee is greater than, less than, or equal to the interchange fee that would 
be set by bilateral negotiations.84 
If regulators have concluded that multi-party payment systems have exhibited 
significantly sub-optimal economic performance, the current state of theoretical and empirical 
research leaves them with three serious challenges if they try to increase payment system 
performance overall and thereby raise economic welfare: 
1. There is no empirical research that reliably addresses whether payment cards or 
any other payment mechanism is used too much or too little. Such research would 
need to consider the social costs and benefits of alternative payment systems and 
consider the effect of other market distortions. 
2. Although it is possible that economists will be able to estimate the quantities 
necessary for determining optimal interchange fees, very little empirical work has 
been done thus far on most of the relevant quantities. 
3. It is not clear that interchange fee regulation is the appropriate intervention for 
correcting distortions in payment systems. The interchange fee is a blunt 
instrument for affecting the prices faced by consumers if issuers assess fixed fees 
as well as variable fees. 
                                                 
84 As we noted above, in the one example of bilateral interchange negotiation on which we have seen data, the 
Australian EFTPOS debit card system, the fee is negative, flowing from issuers to acquirers. And the Reserve 
Bank of Australia is considering raising EFTPOS interchange, shifting costs from consumers to merchants. See 
Macfarlane 2005. 
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